What is sportswashing?
Sportswashing has been the buzzword of choice for Western commentators in the sports world for the last three years. In rapid succession, Saudi Arabia’s sovereign Public Investment Fund (PIF) acquired Newcastle United in Oct. 2021 then bought into the top tier of men’s professional golf via LIV Golf, the PGA Tour, and DP World Tour merger. Then, the 2022 World Cup was held in Qatar. To top it off, Saudi Arabia nationalized four soccer teams in their own Saudi-Pro League, providing the league with limitless cash and newfound access to top-tier talent. First to join was Cristiano Ronaldo in Jan. 2023, and the league has since the signed big names such as Karim Benzema, Sadio Mané, and Neymar Jr. and pushed numerous competitions, such as the FIFA Club World Cup final and the SuperCopa de Espana to be held in Saudi Arabia.
Gulf investment in Western sports began when the Abu Dhabi United Group investment fund bought Manchester City in 2008 and the Qatar Sports Investment (QSI) fund bought Paris Saint-Germain (PSG) in 2011. While these acquisitions are different in practice, they all stem from these states’ shared desire to diversify their economies away from oil production and engage in sportswashing––a form of propaganda whereby groups, including high profile individuals, private businesses, and governments, use sporting events, competitions, and sponsorships as a means to improve their public reputation. These investments tend to divert attention from scandals stemming from problematic business ventures, corruption scandals, environmental disasters, or human rights violations.
How money took over professional sports
As sports clubs grew in popularity over the years, investors came to see professional sports as a worthwhile business opportunity. An influx of cash led to improvements in infrastructure, creating a professional ecosystem in which team owners collected gate revenue from local supporters, with players being able to make a living playing pro sports.
However, as the sports industry expanded, costs of operation soared, and financial stability was far from certain. Locally owned teams with limited financial prowess struggled to ensure the survival of their clubs. Many leagues did not have frameworks in place mandating community ownership, leaving the door open for outside investors. These investors come in the form of individuals, businesses, and governments with deep pockets that were able to pay the freight associated with the increased costs of running these operations.
The bubble keeps growing
Since then, professional sports franchises’ values have increased exponentially over the years. European soccer club Chelsea F.C. was sold in a deal worth $5.4 billion dollars in 2022, up from the $190 million it was bought for in 2003. A.F.C. Bournemouth, a much smaller club, sold for $147 million in 2022. On our side of the pond, the National Football League’s Chicago Bears were purchased for a mere $100 in 1920 and have a franchise value of $6.3 billion today according to a 2023 Forbes estimate.
The value of a professional sports franchise is often difficult to predict. Most are run as private businesses and therefore do not release their financials publicly. However, a certain scarcity in owning a famous sporting franchise lends the asset its value. Even when their associated revenues do not necessarily justify these high valuations, many potential suitors are often vying to purchase any given team when its owner is looking to sell, driving up the eventual price when the asset is sold.
When any professional sports franchise is sold today, only a small subset of the population can actually afford to buy it. Teams, for the most part, are not being purchased by local business owners, but by wealthy investors. Of course, some of these investors have a personal connection to the team and their community or are motivated by civic pride. Increasingly, however, ulterior motives such as the notoriety of being in an exclusive club of professional sports team owners or the accumulation of personal wealth drive the purchase of teams.
We need to be more critical of sportswashing in all of its forms
When we discuss sportswashing, invariably Gulf investment is at the tip of everyone’s tongues. However, sportswashing is not limited to these––it is endemic to the professional sports ecosystem.
Front-of-shirt partnerships with gambling companies, such as Brentford F.C.’s renewal of their sponsorship with Hollywood Bets, is a glaring example of sportswashing, as the renewal occurred shortly after the English Football Association banned Brentford’s star striker for eight months for having a gambling addiction. How is this not criticized as sportswashing?
Potential investment into Manchester United from QSI—a group with strong links to the Qatari state—was criticized by fans as anti-competitive, as the QSI owns PSG in France as well, and denounced as sportswashing. Despite that, when Sir Jim Ratcliffe, the CEO of INEOS, invested into Manchester United via the petrochemical company, he did not receive the same amount of backlash. INEOS also owns OGC Nice and their investment is clearly intended to distract from INEOS’s terrible environmental track record.
These examples are not about states, but nevertheless, they are commercial entities using a professional team (or network of teams) to clean up their public image.
Sports teams everywhere deserve better
The legacy of Reagan- and Thatcher-era market liberalization means that it is not only the world of sports that has embraced investment from morally questionable sources. Sports teams are businesses, but they mean so much more to their communities than purely commercial entities. Ownership by corporations, such as the Red Bull network of clubs, can compromise the beliefs of entire leagues. In the case of Austrian club RB Salzburg, Red Bull erased the 82-year history and identity of the previous club, SV Austria Salzburg, leading to heartbreak for supporters who saw their beloved club fall to ruin. Even in the case of their German club, RB Leipzig, founded in 2011, Red Bull used a loophole in the Bundesliga’s strict 50+1 fan ownership rule to own the club and tie it to their corporate identity. In Germany, football clubs are perceived as having a social duty to their fans rather than being vessels for some ulterior motive, and Red Bull’s conduct with RB Leipzig compromises those morals, making them the country’s most hated club.
As described in a 2022 paper in Sports, Ethics and Philosophy, the tragedy of sportswashing is two-fold: Fans, players, coaches, and journalists become complicit in the immoral actions undertaken by problematic owners, and the sporting heritage of local community institutions is compromised.
The Western world should view the widespread rot of sportswashing as a mirror through which to examine its own faults. After all, how did we get to this point? Who set the rules which allowed this to happen? It should not be up to supporters to give up their childhood club because of morally bankrupt ownership.
Still, there are reasons for hope. The Green Bay Packers are the only non-profit, supporter owned major sports team in North America. The Packers mobilized fan investment to engage in stadium upgrade projects without threatening to uproot the team thereby stiff-arming municipalities into investing public dollars into private infrastructure that does not generate local economic growth. They’ve also won four Super Bowls, most recently in 2010. The Bundesliga is famous for its 50+1 supporter ownership rule, which includes Bayern München, one of the most successful clubs on the planet. The story of Luton Town F.C., promoted to the Premier League last season, is a heartwarming example of the situations of other “phoenix clubs’” saved from ruin by supporters. Community is what sport institutions are rooted in.
Sports teams deserve so much more than to be vessels for the aims of some greater entity, divorced from the reality of community building. It simply isn’t fair to those who sport is actually for, the millions who love the game. The integrity of sport is long gone, and we must bring widespread change or risk losing sight of who sports is actually for. And after we lose that, what else is left?
All figures mentioned in the article are in USD.
